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No Longer Free to Offend: Involuntary
Civil Commitment Statutes for Sexual

Predators Create the Basis for a Uniform Act
INTRODUCTION

How to formulate an effective and constitutional preventative policy for
dealing with repeat sexual predators has baffled this nation for decades. The
public has tired of hearing about yet another dangerous sex offender released
into a community only to abuse again. This is especially so where state
officials were aware the offender posed a substantial danger to the
community but were compelled to release him' because they had no legal
means to keep him in custody.2 Victims' rights advocates and the general
public have demanded some kind of reform in the laws to protect the public
from future victimization by this unique group of offenders.3 Legislators
have responded to these demands by implementing a number of reforms
both to protect the community and to provide treatment options for sexual
offenders. One such reform is the reemergence of involuntary civil
4
commitment statutes which target repeat sex offenders.
While these statutes have been challenged as violative of the Due
Process Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause,5 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predators statute as constitutional in July of 1997.6

1. Women are certainly not excluded from the civil commitment statutes for sexual
predators, however, this Comment will refer to the sexual predator in the male gender due
to the low levels of sexual predation by women. For instance, it is reported that 98.8% of
persons arrested for forcible rape in 1995 were males. Similarly, males comprised 92% of
all arrests for sex offenses (excluding forcible rape and prostitution) in 1995. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 380 (Kathleen Maguire
& Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996).
2. See Saundra Smokes, Child Molester Problem Appears to be Unsolvable, TIMES
UNION, June 30, 1996, at E5, available in 1996 WL 9548068.
3. See Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators,' Los ANGELES TIMES, May 10,
1990 at 1, available in 1990 WL 2398056.
4. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-71.09.230 (West 1992 & Supp.
1998).
5. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
6. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
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Not only are these statutes constitutional, they have worked to cure some of
the defects found in the old commitment statutes and now provide the best
protection to the community against future victimization by repeat sex
offenders.
This Comment explores the creation of the involuntary commitment
statutes and their evolution into what has become a new wave of commitment statutes surfacing around the country. Part I discusses the development of these statutes and gives an example of how an early statute was
designed. Part II discusses the development of the new "sexually violent
predator" statutes beginning in 1990. Additionally, Part H provides an
example of a new involuntary commitment statute and discusses some of the
major differences between the new and old statutes. Part III focuses on the
constitutionality of the sexually violent predator statutes. Finally, Part IV
discusses why the sexually violent predator statutes provide the best
protection to the community relative to other suggested reforms. Part IV
also offers a format for a Uniform Sexually Violent Predators Act. This
model act utilizes the most effective aspects of the new statutes in an
attempt to provide the community with the ultimate level of protection.
I. THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS
A. HISTORY

Like the sexually violent predator statutes of today, early "sexual
psychopath" statutes allowed for the involuntary commitment of repeat sex
offenders.7 Generally, these statutes were used as an alternative to a
criminal conviction, 8 as it was believed that the offender had some kind of
mental abnormality that rendered him "neither normal nor 'legally
insane."'" In 1937, Michigan became the first state to adopt a sexual
psychopath statute" and Illinois soon followed in developing its own

7. John Kip Cornell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of

Sexual Predators,53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996).
8.

ed. 1985).

SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 740 (3d

9. Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 215, 215 (1960).
10. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 780.501-780.509 (1937) (repealed 1967).
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sexual psychopath statute in 1938."

By 1960, twenty-six states and the

District of Columbia had some form of sexual psychopath legislation.'"
These early statutes can most likely be attributed to a trend in society,
beginning in the mid-i 800's and gaining speed through the better part of the

twentieth century, placing more confidence in the field of psychiatry.

3

In

the criminal justice field, this period is referred to as the "positive school"
or "positive criminology."' 4 Positivists focus on biological, psychological,
and social traits of an offender in an attempt to determine what causes
of the positivist is to prevent crime through
criminal behavior.'" The goal
16
treatment and rehabilitation.
The aim of the early statutes was both to rehabilitate the offender and
protect the community from future harm.' 7 The design of these statutes
varied from state to state but many required the offender to have a mental
defect' coupled with a propensity to commit acts of sexual violence.' 9

The time at which a proceeding could be instituted differed depending on

11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 820 (1939). This statute was originally called the
"Commitment of Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons" Act. It did not differ substantially
from its modem counterpart in the designation of sexual psychopaths as:
§ 1. All persons suffering from a mental disorder, and not insane or feebleminded,
which mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one (1) year,
immediately prior to the filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with
criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, are hereby declared to be
criminal sexual psychopathic persons.
To compare this section of the statute with its 1996 counterpart, see infra note 42 and
accompanying text.
12. Those states with sexual psychopath statutes by 1960 include: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For
specific section numbers, see Joseph F. Grabowski V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually
Dangerous PersonsAct: An Examination of a Statute in Need of Change, 12 S.ILL. U. L.J.
437, 454-55 n.106 (1988).
13. Cf.GEORGE B. VOLD & THOMAS J.BERNARD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 36-45
(Edward Sagarin ed., 3d ed. 1986) (tracing the beginning of the positive school of
criminology to Cesare Lombroso in the 1800's and following its gradual progression to what
is referred to today as contemporary positivism).
14. See id. at 45.
15. FRANKLIN P. WILLIAMS III & MARILYN D. MCSHANE, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY
29 (Kerry Reardon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
16. Id.
17. See Swanson, supra note 9.
18. See Michael B. Roche, Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative
Blunder and JudicialAcquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 527-29 (1966); see also,
e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 11.
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the jurisdiction. Some states required a finding that the offender had
committed a sex offense while others required only good cause to believe
that the individual may commit acts of sexual violence in the future.2'
When a sexual psychopath proceeding was instituted, a hearing usually
followed where psychiatric evidence of the offender's mental abnormality
was presented. 1 The procedural protections guaranteed the accused under
the early statutes varied greatly from state to state and stringent protections
consistent with criminal proceedings were often absent.22
Sexual psychopath statutes were severely criticized from their
inception. 23 Critics argued not only that predictions of future dangerousness were unreliable, 24 but also that the sexual psychopath statutes in25
fringed on civil rights and were unsuccessful in treating the offenders.
Not surprisingly, a counter-trend developed and about half of the sexual
psychopath statutes were abolished by the rmiid-1980's. 26 In 1984, only
sixteen states and the District of Columbia still had active sexual psychopath
statutes,27 but even in these states the statutes were rarely utilized.2"
B. AN EXAMPLE OF AN EARLY SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTE

Illinois is one of the few states that kept its sexual psychopath statute
on the books, relatively unchanged, as late as 1997. Illinois has also
become one of the most recent states to adopt a new civil commitment
statute, effective in January of 1997, patterned after the new sexually violent
predator statutes that first became popular in the early 1990'S.29

20. Swanson, supra note 9, at 216.
21. Id. at 217.
22. Id. at 217-18.
23. For a comprehensive look at the problems associated with the early sexual
psychopath statutes, see Andrew Horwitz, Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is There Anywhere
to Go but Backwards?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 35, 41-47 (1995).
24. Roche, supra note 18, at 550.
25. See Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: The Need
to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 215 (1991).
26. See Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community
Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEw ENG. J.ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405,
416 (1997).
27. Id.
28. BRAKEL, supra note 8, at 740 & n.557 (reporting that only Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington used their statutes with any regularity).
29. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 207/1-207/99 (West Supp. 1998).
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The Illinois sexual psychopath statute, adopted in 1938, remained
Several
substantially unchanged between its inception and 1953.30
substantial changes came in 1955 3 when the name of the statute was
changed to the "Sexually Dangerous Persons" Act and all provisions within
the Act referring to the accused as a "criminal sexual psychopathic person"
were changed to reflect the new title. 32 A new section was added to
designate the nature of the proceedings under the Act as civil in nature.33
The Act, as amended, provided an accused with some of the same
procedural rights guaranteed in a criminal proceeding, such as the right to
a trial by jury and the right to have an attorney present.34
The most significant change came in the form of a complete dismissal
of all pending criminal charges, changing part of the aim of the Act. 35 In
the 1953 version, an accused was transferred to the custody of the sheriff in
the county where his commitment proceeding was held upon a verdict that
he had recovered from his "psychopathy" and was competent to stand trial
for the offense with which he was originally charged. 36 The 1955 amendment entirely removed this provision.37 While the statute added a new
section allowing for the accused to be conditionally released should the
Director of the Department of Public Safety and the court find that such
circumstances were warranted, the Act remained mute on the issue of
whether a defendant would face the prior criminal charge upon his
release. 3' Thus, while the Act was still designed to protect the community
from future harm and provide the offender with treatment, it appeared that
such treatment was only provided for its rehabilitative effects.
Despite the statutory changes, Illinois courts continued for many years
to interpret the Act to provide treatment with the sole objective of returning
the cured offender to the county where the commitment proceedings
originated. Once returned, the offender was required to plead to the charges

30. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 820-825 (1939) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 820-825 (1953).
31. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 820-825e (1955).

32. Id.
33. Id. § 822.01.
34. Id. § 824. Still, it was not until 1982 that the Act designated the standard of proof
before one could be committed as a sexually dangerous person as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-3.01 (1983).
35. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 825 (1953) (repealing § 6); see also ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 105-9 (1963) (adding the provision that upon the patient's discharge, all pending
indictments which were the basis of the commitment shall be quashed).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 825 (1953).
37. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 825 (1955).
38. Id. 99 825-825c.
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which were the basis of his commitment and to stand trial for the offense. 9
But, in 1963 the Act was amended once again, this time to include a
provision that quashed all outstanding indictments that served as the basis
for an offender's civil commitment proceeding.' ° It was soon recognized
by Illinois courts that the goal of the Act was only to rehabilitate an
offender 'and return him to the community in lieu of punishment.4'
Illinois courts interpreted the first section of the Act4 2 to require a
prosecutor to prove three essential elements: (1) that the accused had a
mental disorder that existed for at least one year prior to the filing of a
petition, (2) that the accused had a propensity to commit sexual offenses,
and (3) that the accused had demonstrated a propensity to commit acts of
sexual assault.43 An accused had "demonstrated" a propensity to commit
acts of sexual assault if he had engaged in at least one act of sexual assault
or attempted sexual assault."
The Act required that a petition be filed in an Illinois circuit court45
when it appeared to either the Attorney General or the State's Attorney of
the county that an accused qualified as a sexually dangerous person under
the Act.46 Most unusual was that the petition could be filed only in the

39. See People v. McDonald, 194 N.E.2d 541, 543 (I11.
App. Ct. 1963).
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 105-9 (1963). Note also that the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act was incorporated into Article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
as §§ 105-1 to 105-12 in 1963.
41. See People v. Burkhart, 452 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (stating that the
"purpose of the legislation is no longer to determine whether the defendant can stand trial,
but to give the defendant an opportunity to receive help for his propensity to commit sexual
offenses and to protect the public...").
42. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (West 1996) provides as follows:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for
a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition
hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault
or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared sexually dangerous
persons.
43. People v. Pembrock, 342 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ill. 1976).
44. People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 697 (I11.
1985), aff'd sub nom., Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364 (1986).
45. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/2 (West 1996) states that "U]urisdiction of proceedings
under this Act is vested in the circuit courts in this State, for the purpose of conducting
hearings for commitment and detention of such persons, as hereinafter provided."
46. Id. § 3, providing:
When any person is charged with a criminal offense and it shall appear to the
Attorney General or to the State's Attorney of the county wherein such person is
so charged, that such person is a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning
of this Act, then the Attorney General or State's Attorney of such county may file
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same proceeding as a charge for a criminal offense. When a petition was
filed alleging a person to be sexually dangerous under the Act, the court had
to appoint two psychiatrists to examine the accused.47 While the proceedings under the Act were said to be civil in nature,4" the accused could not
be confined as a sexually dangerous person without a showing of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.4 9 Moreover, the defendant had the right to be
represented by an attorney and the right to a trial by jury.5"
The Act provided for a complete discharge upon the filing of an
application and a subsequent hearing if the court found the sexually
dangerous person had recovered. 5 In addition, a conditional discharge
could be accorded where a court found that the patient no longer appeared
to be dangerous but required supervision upon release.52 Finally, pursuant
to changes in 1963, the Act required a court to dismiss all informations and
indictments that served as the basis for a defendant's commitment proceeding upon a finding that his mental disorder no longer existed. 3
II. THE CONTEMPORARY SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIONEER STATUTE IN WASHINGTON

In 1990, Washington became the first state to enact a modem form of
the sexual psychopath statute, providing for the commitment of "sexually
violent predators."' Critics of this new form of legislation have attempted
to classify the inception of the Washington statute as an emotionally
charged, knee-jerk reaction to the 1989 high profile case involving the rape
and sexual mutilation of a seven-year-old Tacoma boy by Earl Shriner."
Shriner was a repeat sex offender who had just recently been released from
with the clerk of the court in the same proceeding wherein such person stands
charged with [a] criminal offense, a petition in writing setting forth facts tending
to show that the person named is a sexually dangerous person.
47. Id. §§ 4-4.01.
48. Id. § 3.01.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 5.
51. Id. § 9.
52. Id. §§ 9-10.
53. Id. § 9.
The
54. Nathaniel L. Taylor, Note and Comment, Abuse of Judicial Review:
Unwarranted Demise of the Sexually Violent Predators Statute by Young v. Weston, 71
WASH. L. REv. 543, 546 (1996). See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-71.09.230
(West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
55. See, e.g., Gleb, supra note 25, at 213-14; see also Horowitz, supra note 23, at 48-
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a ten-year sentence for assaulting and kidnapping two girls.56 While the
Shriner case was influential in promoting sex predator legislation, attributing
the inception of this legislation solely to one incident fails to recognize the
impact of several years of campaigning by two different grass-roots
organizations, whose goal was to protect the community against further
victimization, and the testimony of over 150 victims of sexual assault at
public hearings to discuss the problem of repeat sex offenders.5 7 This
attribution similarly fails to recognize what many members of the community knew; that government "response to sexual violence was inadequate in all
cases, not just in those that became notorious.""
Simply put, the Washington statute was not constructed over-night in
a thoughtless state of frenzy. Rather, the governor of Washington created
the Task Force on Community Protection and appointed his opponent in the
last gubernatorial race, Norm Maleng, to head the committee.59 While the
bill proposed by the task force increased sentences for sex crimes, Maleng
and his colleagues also recognized that the incarceration of persons not
legally insane to prevent future sex crimes is an unconstitutional use of
penal detention.' The committee was also aware that changes in sentence
lengths could not retroactively apply to repeat sex offenders already incarcerated. 6 Finally, the task force found that Washington's existing civil
commitment statute, which had been modified in 1973 to put an end to
"inappropriate, indefinite commitment," was geared towards short-term confinement of severely mentally ill persons. 62 This made the civil commitment statute inappropriate for the long-term commitment of sex offenders,
not mentally insane under legal standards, but who possess a mental abnormality or disorder that manifests itself in "episodic acts of sexual violence. 63 In fact, Washington officials attempted to commit Earl Shriner,
who later raped and mutilated the Tacoma child, just prior to his release

56. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET

SOUND L. REv. 525, 526-27 (1992).

57. See Siegel, supra note 3.
58. See Boerner, supra note 56, at 577 n.149.
59. Siegel, supra note 3. The director of the King-County Public Defenders
Association was quoted as saying that Maleng is not a "screaming crazy guy" but a
"reasonable" man. Id. Another task force member was David Boerner, a law professor from
the University of Puget Sound, who is said to have told his colleagues that he wanted to be
involved in the process "to limit its effect." Id. See supra note 56 for Boemer's article on
his involvement with the task force.
60. Siegel, supra note 3.
61. Boerner, supra note 56, at 549-50.
62. Id. at 543.
63. Id. at 544.
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from a ten year confinement for the assault of two girls, but the court found
that Shriner did not meet the statutory criteria of a mentally ill person under
the existing civil commitment statute. 64 This was true even though officials were aware that he "had hatched elaborate plans to maim or kill young",65
sters while waiting out the final months of his prison sentence ....
The task force finally came to the conclusion that Washington's legal
system contained a long-standing "gap" into which the "Earl Shriners" of
the state continued to fall.66 The state lacked the authority to act in a
situation where officials were aware that a repeat offender with a serious
mental disorder, but not legally insane, was about to be released from a
prison term and posed a substantial risk of committing violent sex offenses
in the future. 67 For instance, Washington officials denied all parole
requests from Shriner, who had a twenty-four year history of murder, assault
and kidnapping, 68 because they were aware of the likelihood that he would
continue to molest and assault children upon his release.69 Once Shriner
served the full term of his sentence, however, officials had no choice but to
release him upon finding that he did not qualify for involuntary commitment
under Washington's civil commitment statute.70 Thus came the proposal
to create a statute which would allow the state to institutionalize sexually
violent predators not only prior to a criminal charge or conviction but also
upon their release from a prison sentence.
B. ELEMENTS OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES

Four years after the Washington statute was enacted, Kansas created a
sexually violent predator statute of its own.7 Because the Kansas statute
64. Id. at 527.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 546.
67. See id.
68. In 1966, a sixteen-year-old Shriner led police to the body of a young girl, who had
been strangled and tied to a tree, but he was never charged with the offense. Instead,
Shriner was committed to the Department of Institutions for psychiatric care. In 1977, he
pled guilty to the assault and kidnapping of two teenage girls and was sentenced to 10 years
in prison. Shriner was twice acquitted of charges in relation to two different assaults on
women. He later spent 66 days in jail for a second degree assault and 67 days in jail for the
unlawful imprisonment of a young boy. Shriner was originally charged in that instance with
attempted statutory rape and unlawful imprisonment for tying the boy to a fence post and
beating him before the child was able to escape. Id. at 526-27.
69. See id. at 527. Prison officials were also aware that Shriner had gone so far as to
create lists of "apparatus" he would need in order carry out his plans to assault and murder
children. Id.
70. Id.
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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is identical to the Washington statute in almost all relevant respects,72 and
because the United States Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predators statute73 rather than the Washington
statute, the elements of the Kansas statute will be discussed within this
section.
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predators statute allows for the involuntary civil commitment of persons who possess a "mental disease or defect,"
rendering them sufficiently likely to engage in repetitive acts of sexual
predation, requiring "long-term care and treatment. 74
The Kansas
legislature adopted the Washington legislature's finding that sexual predators
have antisocial personality disorders which render them unfit candidates for
commitment under the existing civil commitment statutes geared towards
short-term confinement and a quick return to the community.7 5
The Kansas statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as any person
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and "who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence; if not confined in a
secure facility." 76 A "mental abnormality" is defined as "a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."77 A
"sexually violent offense" includes among other things: rape, indecent

72. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-71.09.230 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998)
with KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
73. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
75. Id. Section 59-29a01 states in pertinent part:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them
appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment act for mentally ill
persons ... which is intended to provide short-term treatment to individuals with
serious mental disorders and then return them to the community .... [Slexually
violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and those features
render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior .... [Tiherefore a civil
commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent
.predator is found to be necessary by the legislature.
76. Id. § 59-29a02. The term "personality disorder" was chosen for the proposed
Washington statute because it is a condition that is usually accepted in the medical field. See
Boerner, supra note 56, at 569. The term "mental abnormality" on the other hand, is a legal
term but includes those persons suffering from "paraphilias," a medical definition that applies
to most persons who are repeat sex offenders. Id.
77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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liberties with a child, indecent solicitation of a child, sexual exploitation of
a child, aggravated sexual battery, and any criminal act that is determined
beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated.78
The statute provides for notification to the Attorney General79 ninety
days prior to the anticipated release from confinement of a possible sexually
violent predator, where such person was convicted of a sexually violent
offense, was charged with a sexually violent offense but was found
incompetent to stand trial, or was found not guilty of a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity.8" If it appears that the offender is a sexually
violent person within the meaning of the statute, a petition is filed by the
Attorney General within seventy-five days of initial notification, alleging
facts sufficient to support the allegation." A judge must then determine
whether there is probable cause to direct that such person be taken into
custody. 2 At this hearing, the offender is entitled to the assistance of an
attorney, to present evidence on his behalf, to cross-examine witnesses, and
to view all information in the court file.83 If a determination is made that
probable cause exists, the offender is taken into custody. 4 The accused
has a right to a hearing within seventy-two hours after the probable cause
determination where he may contest such findings.8 5 Once a court
determines there is probable cause to detain the offender, an evaluation is
conducted by a "professionally qualified" person to determine whether the
offender constitutes a sexually violent predator.86 Presumably, such
findings are given to the court.
Within sixty days of completion of the probable cause hearing, a trial
is conducted to determine whether the accused is a sexually violent

78. Id.
79. Id. § 59-29a03. The statute also provides for notification to a "multidisciplinary
team," established by the Secretary of Corrections, which reviews the records of persons
referred to the team in order to determine whether such persons qualify as sexually violent
predators. The team's findings are then relayed to the Attorney General. Id. § 59-29a03(d).
80. Id. § 59-29a03.
81. Id. § 59-29a04.
82. Id. § 59-29a05(a).
83. Id. § 59-29a05(c). The creators of the Washington statute similarly employed the
"full panoply of procedural protections" despite the statute's classification as civil in nature.
See Boerner, supra note 56, at 570.
84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
85. Id. § 59-29a05(b). If the offender chooses to contest the findings made at the first
probable cause hearing, another probable cause determination must be made in order to
further detain the offender. The State may add additional evidence to the original petition
or present testimony. Id.
86. Id. § 59-29a05(d).
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person. s7 At all stages the offender is entitled to be represented by an
attorney and an attorney will be appointed by the court in the event that the
accused is indigent.8 The offender also has the right to demand a trial by
jury. 9 Whenever the offender is subject to an examination under the Act,
he may retain his own experts to perform an evaluation on his behalf."
A person may only be deemed a sexually violent predator person by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,9' and where this determination is made by a
jury, the verdict must be unanimous.92 A person found to be a sexually
violent predator is transferred to the care and custody of the Secretary of the
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services where he must be kept in
a secure facility and segregated from all other patients.93
A qualified expert conducts an examination once every year to
determine the offender's mental condition.94 Such expert then files a report
with the court which committed the offender so that the court is able to
conduct a review of his mental status.95 At this hearing, the offender may
petition the court for release even absent the Secretary's approval.9 6 If the
87. Id. § 59-29a06. For commitment sought against persons charged with a sexually
violent offense but found incompetent to stand trial, the court must first determine whether
the defendant did commit the act(s) with which he was charged. Id. § 59-29a07(b). If such
determination is made, the court may proceed with the trial to determine whether the person
qualifies as a sexually violent predator. Id.
88. Id. § 59-27a06.
89. Id.
90. The Act provides for court assistance in retaining expert counsel for the indigent
defendant. Id. § 59-29a06. The Washington statute contains a similar provision said to
eliminate the possible prejudices that can occur from state appointment of the sole expert
witness at trial. Boerner, supra note 56, at 570.
91. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996). The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, rather than the clear and convincing standard often found in civil
commitment statutes, was used to convey "the importance of the determination." Boerner,
supra note 56, at 570.
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
93. Id. In Illinois v. Allen, 478 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1986), a case referred to by the
United States Supreme Court in determining the constitutionality of the Kansas statute, the
Court noted that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was not punitive in nature
simply because offenders adjudged to be sexually dangerous persons were committed to the
custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections and were housed in the Menard
Psychiatric Center, a maximum security institution which houses convicts as well as persons
committed under the Act. Nevertheless, Illinois has now changed its statute to assign its
sexually violent persons to the custody of the Department of Human Services. See 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(a), 207/40(a) (West Supp. 1998).
94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
95. Id.
96. In fact, the Secretary of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services must
provide the offender annually with a written notice of his right to petition the court for
release whether or not the secretary finds the offender is rehabilitated. Id.
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court finds probable cause to believe the offender's mental status has
changed so that he may be safe to be released from custody, the court is to
97
schedule a hearing to determine whether such release should occur. At
this hearing, the offender has the same rights afforded at his commitment
proceeding. 9 The burden rests with the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offender's mental status has not changed in that he is
not safe to be released. 99
The Secretary of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services
must allow the offender to petition the court for release where he or she
finds that the offender's mental condition has changed to such an extent that
he is unlikely to commit sexual offenses in the future." A hearing must
be held within thirty days of receipt of the petition."0 ' The offender may
petition the court for release upon his own motion and without authorization
of the Secretary, but, if the petition is found to be "frivolous" or his condition unchanged, subsequent petitions from the offender will be denied unless
°
they contain sufficient facts to show that a new hearing is warranted."
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OLD SEXUAL
C.
STATUTES AND THE NEW SEX PREDATOR STATUTES

PSYCHOPATH

An easily recognized difference between the old sexual psychopath
statutes and the new sexually violent predator statutes is in the classification
given to offenders. The early statutes described the offender in a variety 'of
10 3
terms, such as a "Sexual Psychopath" or a "Psychopathic Offender,'
while the new statutes consistently define an offender as a "Sexually Violent
Predator" or a "Sexually Violent Person."' 1 4 The terms "sexual psychopath" and "psychopathic offender" were generally defined by an offender's
reckless, impulsive, or emotionally unstable behavior.0 5 On the other
hand, a "sexually violent predator" is generally defined as a person who has

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. The Attorney General represents the State at such hearing and may request both

a trial by jury and an examination of the offender by an expert on behalf of the State. Id.
100. Id. § 59-29a10.

101. Both the offender and the State may request that the hearing is before a jury and

the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender's mental abnormality or
personality disorder is unchanged in that the offender presents a danger to the community.

Id.

102. Id. § 59-29a11.
103. Roche, supra note 18, at 528-29.
104. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); see
also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.01 (West Supp. 1997).
105. See Roche, supra note 18, at 529-30.
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been charged with or convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers
from a mental abnormality or disorder, such as paraphilia, which makes him
likely to commit sexual offenses in the future'0 6 While most, if not all,
persons exhibit behavior at one time or another which society would deem
irrational or unstable, the new sex predator statutes narrow the class of
persons constituting sexually violent predators to a small group of persons
who have been charged with or convicted of a sexual offense and who pose
an ongoing danger to the community.
Moreover, the new sex predator statutes consistently provide the
accused with the stringent procedural protections found in criminal proceedings, such as: (1) the right to have his fate determined by a jury, (2) the
right to counsel, (3) the right to cross-examine witnesses, (4) the right to
present evidence on his own behalf, and (5) the right to copy all documents
in the court file." While some of the early statutes afforded the accused
similar protections," 8 others provided very few. Several statutes, for
instance, required only that a judge decide whether the offender was a
sexual psychopath on the basis of medical reports."
The most significant difference between the sexual psychopath and the
sexually violent predator statutes is the time at which a petition for
involuntary commitment may be filed. The early statutes varied substantially in this respect. Some allowed a filing upon a criminal charge or
conviction for a sexual offense, others upon a charge for any offense, and
still others upon no charge but where circumstances warranted a judicial
determination as to whether an individual was a sexual psychopath."0 If
an offender was adjudged a sexual psychopath, he was generally transferred
to an institution for care and treatment."' Most statutes provided that
commitment of an offender under the civil commitment statute prohibited
any kind of criminal sentencing for the crime upon which the petition was
filed." 2 Unlike the old statutes, a petition under the new sex predator
statutes is most often filed when a convicted sex offender is close to his
anticipated release date from total confinement." 3 Thus, an offender who
106. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601 (West Supp. 1997).
107. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a05(c) to 59-29a06 (1994 & Supp. 1996); see
also supra text accompanying note 83.
108. Roche, supra note 18, at 534-35.
109. Swanson, supra note 9, at 218.
110. Roche, supra note 18, at 530-31.
111. Id. at 535.
112. Id. at 537.
113. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). The
statutes similarly provide for the filing of a petition upon the anticipated release of an indivi-
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is charged with a violent sex offense usually must first serve a criminal
sentence before the designated state officials may attempt to have the

offender adjudged a sexually violent predator. This statutory framework has
spurred many arguments in the legal community as to whether the new
involuntary commitment statutes violate protections against double jeopardy
and ex post facto lawmaking.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
STATUTE:

KANSAS V. HENDRICKS

Since the enactment of the Sexually Violent Predators statutes in
4
Washington and Kansas, similar statutes have been enacted in Arizona,"
6 Iowa,"'
Constitutional
and Wisconsin."'
California,"' Illinois,"
arguments by opponents of the new sexually violent predator statutes have
generally been based upon assertions that the statutes violate guarantees of
substantive due process and equal protection, and violate prohibitions against
In Kansas v.
double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking." 9
2 ' the United States Supreme Court considered challenges to
Hendricks,
the Kansas statute concerning substantive due process, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because other justices and courts
have addressed violations of the Equal Protection Clause, this Comment will
also address the equal protection argument.
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, enacted in 1994, was
invoked for the first time against Leroy Hendricks.' 2 ' Hendricks was
dual charged with a sexually violent offense who was found incompetent to stand trial or not
guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
114. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4613 (West Supp. 1997).
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West Supp. 1998).
116. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1-207/99 (West Supp. 1998).
117. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1-709C.12 (West Supp. 1997). The Iowa statute was
repealed prior to its taking effect in July of 1997 by ch. 1082, §§ 7-8.
118. WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-980.13 (West Supp. 1997).
119. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2088 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the Court's conclusion that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not violated
in applying the Kansas statute to Hendricks); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 754 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) (concluding that the Washington Sexually Violent Predators statute violates the
substantive due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause,
and the Double Jeopardy Clause); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 136 (Wis. 1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Wisconsin Sexually Violent Person
Commitments statute violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post
facto lawmaking and violates constitutional guarantees of substantive due process and equal
protection).
120. 117 S.Ct. at 2072.
121. Id. at 2076.
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scheduled for release from a prison sentence on September 11, 1994.122
Hendricks had a lengthy history of molesting children. He is currently in
his sixties and began his career of molesting children back in 1955 when he
exposed himself to two young girls.
Two years later, Hendricks was
convicted of lewdness in connection with a teenage girl. 24 In 1960,
Hendricks was imprisoned for three years for molesting two boys while he
was working at a carnival.' 25 In the same year of his release he was again
arrested, this time for molesting a seven-year-old, and was released just two
years after this second conviction. 26 In 1967, Hendricks was convicted
of having sex with a young boy and girl. 127 He spent five years in prison,
where he refused to participate in a treatment program, and was again
released in 1972.128 Shortly after his release, Hendricks began molesting
his own stepson and stepdaughter, and he was finally incarcerated in
connection with this abuse in 1984.129 Hendricks was imprisoned on these
charges until 1994 when Kansas authorities filed the petition to have him
civilly committed. 30
While some critics argue that current methods of predicting future
criminal behavior are unreliable, 3' Hendricks exemplifies the kind of
identifiable repeat sex offender for whom the new sexually violent predator
statutes were developed. Not only has Hendricks been diagnosed as a
pedophile, 32 he readily admits that he is a pedophile and that he is
uncured of the condition.
Hendricks has also stated that when he gets
"stressed out" he is unable to stop himself from forcing children
to engage
in sex, 13 that he will not stop abusing children until he dies, and that he
has no plans of dying anytime soon."3
122. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996).
123. Id. at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting). Hendricks pled guilty to indecent exposure. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. During his stay in prison, authorities attempted to treat Hendricks but released
him just two years later considering him "safe to be at large." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Lenore M.J. Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical
Analysis, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387, 402 (1997); see also Gleb,
supra note 25, at 226-27.
132. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 131.
134. Id.
135. Nola Foulston & Carla J. Stovall, Supreme Court to ConsiderKansasLaw Keeping
Predator Confined, PROSECUToR, Apr. 31, 1997, at 26, 26.
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A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Hendricks' appeal reached the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1996.36
Because that court determined the Act violated the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not reach Hendricks' other challenges to
the statute, namely that it violates prohibitions against double jeopardy and
ex post facto lawmaking.' 37 Hendricks argued that the involuntary civil
commitment of sexual predators violates substantive due process because the
Act only requires the showing of a mental abnormality or personality
disorder rather than a finding of "mental illness."' 138 The Kansas Supreme
Court agreed and cited to Foucha v. Louisiana 39 for the proposition that
an individual may not be civilly detained absent a showing of mental
illness."4
The court believed the statute lacked the requisite "mental illness"
element set forth in Foucha because the statute provides for the confinement
of offenders on the pretense of a mental abnormality or personality disorder
and thus held the statute unconstitutional. 4' The United States Supreme

136. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 129.
137. Id. at 138.
138. Id. at 133-34. The Washington Supreme Court confronted a similar attack to its
Sexually Violent Predators statute but ultimately held that the statute did not violate
petitioners' substantive due process rights since the United States Supreme Court has used
such terms as "mentally ill" and "mentally disordered" interchangeably. In re Young, 857
P.2d 989, 1001 & n.3 (1993), rev'd sub nom., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1995). The Washington District Court subsequently held the statute violative of
petitioners' substantive due process rights for the same reason espoused by the Kansas
Supreme Court. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749-51.
139. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). The petitioner in Foucha was found not guilty of aggravated
burglary by reason of insanity. Id. at 73-74. Four years later at a discharge hearing, a
physician testified that Foucha was most likely suffering from "a drug induced psychosis"
at the time of the incident and that he currently showed "no signs of psychosis." Id. at 75.
While it was determined that Foucha was no longer mentally ill, the examining physician
found that he did suffer from an "antisocial personality" which rendered him a danger to
society. Id. Foucha was returned to the mental institution based solely on the belief that he
constituted a danger to himself or others. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
relying on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), which held that in order to civilly
commit someone, a state must show by clear and convincing evidence "that the person
sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own
welfare and protection of others." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76. While Foucha was properly
committed at the time of the incident, the Court determined that he could not be held based
solely upon future dangerousness without the presence of a mental illness. Id. at 78.
140. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137.
141. Id. at 138. Interestingly, both the Kansas and the Washington Supreme Courts
included a discussion on whether terms describing some form of mental illness, such as
"personality disorder,"-"antisocial behavior," and "mental abnormality" are included within
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Court reversed, indicating that it has previously Upheld civil commitment
statutes that require a showing of dangerousness coupled with the existence
of a "mental illness" or "mental abnormality."' 42 The Court further found
that the term "mental illness" lacks any "talismanic significance."' 43 In
the spirit of federalism, state legislatures have historically been left the task
of determining which particular terms will be adopted by their civil
commitment statutes, and also how such mental health terms will be defined
in a legal context." The states have chosen a variety of terms and very
often, those terms do not comport with psychiatric definitions. Because the
terms used to define the requisite mental disorder within the sex predator
statutes serve a legal and not a medical function, there is no reason for
courts to place an undue emphasis upon how the psychiatric community
would define such illnesses.
The Court held that the Kansas statute complies with the requirements
set forth for civil commitment statutes because the State must prove that the
offender suffers from a "personality disorder" or "mental abnormality"
which is likely to manifest itself in future predatory acts of sexual violence."' 5 This element serves to narrow the reach of the classification to
a group of persons with a volitional impairment that renders them dangerous
to others."
With regard to Hendricks, the Kansas statute was not
violative of his constitutional right to substantive due process because he has
been diagnosed with pedophilia and suffers from a lack of volitional control
7
which manifests itself in an urge to abuse children."'
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND EX POST FACTO

Hendricks next argued that the Kansas statute, though said to be civil,
was actually criminal in nature and therefore, commitment under the statute

the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(referred to as DSM-III-R and DSM IV), regardless of the fact that the mental illness
requirement found in civil commitment statutes is not a psychiatric diagnosis but a legal
determination. See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 135, 137-38 and In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,
1001-03 (Wash. 1993). It follows that "[there is no justification for linking constitutional
standards to the shifting sands of academic thought reflected in the DSM-IV and its frequent
revisions." Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 149 (Larson, J., dissenting).
142. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997).
143. Id. The Court has used a variety of terms to describe mental conditions subjecting
persons to civil commitment such as "emotionally disturbed," "mentally ill," "incompetency,"
and "insanity." Id. at 2080-81.
144. Id. at 2081.
145. Id; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a03 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
146. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
147. Id.
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serves to punish the offender. 148 Because the statute allows for commitment which is predicated upon a criminal charge and occurs after the
offender has served a prison sentence, Hendricks believed the statute to be
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. 49
The test to determine whether a statute is civil in nature rather than punitive,
was set forth in United States v. Ward.1"° According to Ward, a court
must first determine whether the legislature intended the statute to be civil
in nature."' If so, the court generally defers to legislative intent unless
the party challenging the statute can show that "the statutory scheme [is]
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention.' ' 2
The Hendricks Court noted that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act was placed within the probate code55 rather than in the criminal code
as an indication that the Kansas legislature intended the statute to be civil
in nature."5 The Act itself states that the legislature found a need for "a
civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment" of repeat
sex offenders. 5 5 The Court found "[n]othing on the face of the statute"
to suggest "that the legislature sought to create anything other than a civil
commitment scheme to protect the public from harm."' 156 As a civil label
in itself is not dispositive 57 the Court looked at three additional factors
apart from Hendricks' challenges and determined that the aim of the statute
was civil and not punitive.
First, the Court found that the statute did not serve the traditional aims
of retribution and deterrence that accompany a criminal conviction.'
Focusing first on retribution, the Court compared the ultimate aim of the
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
151. Id.
152. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
153. There is no explanation within the Kansas statute nor within the Hendricks decision
to explain the placement of the statute within the probate code.
154. Id.
155. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); see also Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
156. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
157. Id. (citing to Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)). The Allen Court found
the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, which allowed for the involuntary commitment
of repeat sex offenders, civil in nature. 478 U.S. at 375. While providing the Hendricks
Court with some precedential value, the Illinois Act differed substantially from the new sex
predator statutes in that the government was required to choose between pursuing a criminal
conviction or filing a petition for the involuntary commitment of the offender. See 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 205/0.01-205/12 (West 1996).
158. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
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Kansas statute to that of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act held
to be civil in nature in Allen v. Illinois.'59 While commitment under both
statutes is predicated upon a criminal offense, such conduct is used only to
determine whether a "mental abnormality" exists and to determine whether
the offender poses a risk to the community'6 The Court has recognized
6
that past criminal behavior is often a good prediction of future conduct.' '
The Court further noted that the Act does not require a conviction to
institute commitment proceedings. 62 Persons who are adjudged incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity may nevertheless be
committed involuntarily under the Act. 163 The absence of criminal
responsibility, the Court stated, negates any intent by the State to punish for
a past criminal act."6
Second, the Court found that unlike criminal proceedings, the Act does
not require a finding of scienter 65 which it has noted in the past is an
indication that a statute is civil and not criminal in nature." The offender's intent is not an issue, rather, commitment proceedings are based upon
67
the finding of a mental abnormality or personality disorder.'
68
Third, the Act was not developed to function as a deterrent.
Because the sexual predator suffers from a volitional impairment in the form
of a mental abnormality, the court reasoned that a threat of confinement
169
could not act to deter him from committing a sexual offense.
The Court then rejected Hendricks' argument that the Act serves to
punish offenders because it could possibly result in indefinite confinement. 70 States have historically been able, through their use of police

159. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 157.
160. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
161. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (stating that violent behavior exhibited
in the past can be indicative of future episodes of violence).
162. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
163. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994).
164. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
165. Id. "Scienter" is defined as a term "frequently used to signify the defendant's
guilty knowledge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
166. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (construing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168 (1963)). The Kennedy Court stated that "[a]bsent conclusive evidence of
congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute," such factors as a finding of scienter
and whether the statute serves the traditional aims of punishment "must be considered in
relation to the statute on its face." Id. at 168-69.
167. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at'2082.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2083.

A UNIFORM ACT FOR SEXUAL PREDATORS

1998]

171
power, to confine mentally ill persons who pose a threat to society.
Such confinement is thoroughly legitimate as it is linked solely to the
amount of time it takes to successfully treat an offender. 7 2 The Court
further noted that an individual may be confined for only up to one year
based upon a single court proceeding. 7 1 If continued detention beyond
one year is warranted, the State must prove that the offender continues to
suffer from a mental abnormality that renders him likely to engage in acts
of sexual predation. 74 The Court found that these elements designed to
protect the offender, indicate that the State has no interest in punitively
confining
an individual for a period longer than it takes to successfully treat
5

him.

17

The Court was able to quickly dismiss Hendricks' contention that the
Act's use of protections typically found in criminal procedures 176 renders
it punitive in nature. This is because the Court already determined in Allen
v. Illinois'7" that the use of such protections merely serve to narrow the
effect of the statute to the commitment
of only a small group of extremely
78
dangerous sexual offenders.
Finally, the Court rejected Hendricks' argument that the Act was
unconstitutional because Kansas did not provide "legitimate 'treat-

171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Id. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (Supp. 1996) states in pertinent part:
Each person committed under this act shall have a current examination of the
person's mental condition made once every year....
The attorney general shall
represent the state and shall have a right to a jury trial and to have the committed
person evaluated by experts chosen by the state. The committed person shall also
have the right to have experts evaluate that person on the person's behalf and the
court shall appoint an expert if the person is indigent and requests an appointment.
The burden of proof at the hearing shall be upon the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the committed person's mental abnormality or personality
disorder remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.
174: Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994 &
Supp. 1996).
175. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
176. Pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a05 to 59-29a06 (Supp. 1996), the accused
is entitled to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence on his own behalf, to crossexamine witnesses, and to copy all information in the court file at his probable cause hearing
and at his trial.
177. 478 U.S. at 371-72 (finding that the State's decision to provide the accused with
procedural protections similar to those found in criminal proceedings "cannot itself turn these
proceedings into criminal prosecutions..
178. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
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ment. ' ' ' 179 It was noted that the Kansas Supreme Court held sexually
violent predators could not be detained by the State absent the existence of
a mental abnormality that is treatable."o The Court rejected this argument
by noting that the Constitution does not prevent a state from institutionalizing mentally ill persons who present a danger to society simply because the
condition is incurable.' 8 ' Moreover, a commitment statute is not punitive
simply because treatment is only an "ancillary purpose" of the Act. 8 2 The
Court did note, however, that under the Act, the Secretary of Social and
Rehabilitation Services has an affirmative duty to provide treatment to
committed persons."' According to Kansas officials, persons committed
under the Act were receiving approximately 31.5 hours of treatment per
week. " ' In light of all the factors considered, the Court found the Kansas
statute was civil and not criminal in nature.
Accordingly, the Court was able to dismiss Hendricks' contention that
proceedings under the Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits both multiple prosecutions
and multiple punishments. 8 Because the Kansas Act is civil in nature,
commitment proceedings under the Act, even when they occur after the
offender has been criminally convicted, cannot constitute a subsequent
prosecution.8 Similarly, a commitment under the Act cannot constitute
a subsequent "punishment" for the same crime upon which the commitment
proceeding was predicated. 8 7 The Court next noted that it has interpreted
the Ex Post Facto Clause, which prohibits an increase in "punishment for a
crime after its commission," '88 to apply only to statutes penal in nature.1 89 Because the Act is civil in nature, the Ex Post Facto Clause is
inapplicable.' 9 Moreover, the statute does not apply retroactively to
discern an offender's mental status at the time when a sexual offense was

179. Id.

180. Id. at 2084 (citing to In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)).
181. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
182. Id.
183. Id. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994 & Supp. 1996) provides that where a
"court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be
committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control,
care and treatment .... "
184. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085.
185. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
186. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
187. Id.
188. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 154 (Larson, J., dissenting).
189. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
190. See id.
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committed, but instead permits involuntary commitment only when it is
shown the that the offender suffers from some sort of mental abnormality
at the filing of the petition.19
C. EQUAL PROTECTION

While the Supreme Court majority in Hendricks did not address an
equal protection challenge, an analysis of the new involuntary civil
commitment statutes reveals that the statutes do not deny a defendant equal
protection of the law even when reviewed under the strictest level of
scrutiny."9 Defendants charged under the new sexually violent predator
statutes have argued that the statutes deny offenders equal protection of the
93
law because persons who are similarly situated are not treated alike.'
These arguments have focused mainly on the fact that the statute singles out
only dangerous sex offenders for involuntary commitment and not offenders
of other violent crimes, 94 and that sex predator statutes contain substantively different schemes than statutes for the commitment of the mentally
ill.

19 5

While different justices and courts have disagreed as to whether to
classify civilly committed sex offenders and civilly committed mentally ill
persons as similarly situated,' 96 many have found that the sex predator
statutes are not violative of the equal protection clause. 97 The courts have
agreed that the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from
a unique class of individuals who pose a significant threat of committing
future acts of sexual violence.' 98 This compelling interest "provides the
191. See id.
dissenting); see also State v. Post, 541
192. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J.,
N.W.2d 115, 130 (Wis. 1995).
193. See, e.g., Post, 541 N.W.2d at 128-29.
dissenting).
194. See, e.g., Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J.,
195. See, e.g., Post, 541 N.W.2d at 128.
196. CompareHendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J., dissenting) (holding that sexually
violent predators and the mentally ill are not similarly situated "for the limited and narrow
purpose of the Act"), with Post, 541 N.W.2d at 129 (holding that persons committed under
the sex predator statute and persons committed under the civil commitment statute for the
mentally ill are similarly situated "for purposes of an equal protection comparison").
197. See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J., dissenting); see also Post, 541 N.W.2d
at 130; cf.In re Twining, 894 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause is not violated simply because the statute distinguishes between
persons likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence who were charged with or
convicted of a sex offense and those similarly likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence but who were not charged with a sex offense because the statute of limitations had
run).
198. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 130.
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necessary justification for the differential treatment" between those persons
determined to be mentally ill and those determined to suffer from a mental
disorder that renders them likely to engage in acts of sexual predation.' 99
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the state statute "have some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. ''200 This
requirement, however, does not demand that all persons be treated alike
under the laws of the state.20' State legislatures have broad authority to
identify and establish treatment programs for persons who suffer from some
mental abnormality that renders them a danger to themselves or others.2'
The important question then becomes whether the state interest is furthered
by the means employed. 0 3
In developing the first sexually violent predator statute, the Washington
legislature found that a "small but extremely dangerous group" of persons
exist who lack the requisite "mental disease or defect" that would subject
them to treatment under the then existing civil commitment statute for
mentally ill persons. 2' The legislature determined that the likelihood of
such offenders engaging in repetitive acts of sexual violence was extremely
high, however, if the offenders were left untreated. 2 5 Thus, a legislative
approach that distinguishes between repeat sex offenders who possess a
mental disorder and other mentally ill persons or violent offenders whose
cfimes are not of a sexual nature is justified because sexually violent
predators have unique treatment requirements and pose such a high risk to
the community of committing repeat acts of sexual predation.2°6
IV. THE NEED FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE IN
EVERY STATE
In her book entitled Still Unequal, Lorraine Dusky cites a 1992 survey
conducted by the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center of the
Medical University of South Carolina for the proposition that approximately
683,000 women over the age of eighteen are raped every year.2" The
figure grossly understates the number of rapes that occur annually, however,

199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 UCS. 107, 111 (1966)).
201. Id.
202. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J., dissenting).
203. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 130.
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (West 1992).
205. Id.
206. See Post, 541 N.W.2d at 130; see also infra note 213 and accompanying text
discussing the unique trauma and its consequences suffered by victims of sexual assault.
207. LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL 380 (1996).
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as sixty percent of women surveyed stated that they were raped under the
age of eighteen." 8 Researchers concluded that the number of sexual
assaults that occur every year in the United States alone was at least 1.5
million. 2" Of note is that this figure fails to account for the number of
sexual assaults against males, particularly young boys. Another study,
conducted in California, found that sex offenders are five times more likely
to recidivate than other violent crime offenders.21 0
While studies have disagreed on the number of children the average
pedophile molests, there appears to be a consensus that these incidents are
not simply a one time occurrence. A study funded by the National Institute
of Mental Health, with a sample population of 453 pedophiles, found that
1
Other
each offender "molested an average of 52 girls or 150 boys."'
studies have reported anywhere from twenty-three to seventy-two child
victims per pedophile.1 2 While studies of the numbers of sexual assaults
per year and the number of children molested by the average pedophile are
varied and uncertain, what is certain is that sexual assaults and child
molestation in this country are at epidemic levels. Couple this with the
harrowing effects of such assaults on the victims, 213 and it becomes
evident that the problem of repeat sex offenders can no longer be left to an
ineffective criminal justice system.
A. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES: THE BEST PROTECTION
AGAINST VICTIMIZATION BY REPEAT SEX OFFENDERS

During oral argument in the Hendricks case before the United States
Supreme Court, Hendricks' attorney, Thomas J. Weilert, admitted to the
justices that there was "no doubt" that his client, if released, posed a
substantial risk to the community.21 4 Weilert's solution to this problem

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Smokes, supra note 2.
211. Teir & Coy, supra note 26, at 408. It is unclear from the article why there is such
a disparity between the numbers of boys and girls abused by the average pedophile.
212. Id.
213. Victims of a sexual assault suffer a variety of mental and physical ailments in the
aftermath of the abuse which can haunt a victim throughout his or her lifetime. Many of
these ailments are often unique to the sexual assault victim as compared to those suffered by
victims of other violent crimes. Victims of sexual abuse and researchers alike have noted
that the effects of sexual abuse take many forms, including: depression, panic disorder, a
pattern of abusive intimate relationships, drg abuse, alcoholism, eating disorders, suicide
attempts, and multiple personality disorders to name a few. See ELLEN BASS & LAURA
DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL 36, 37, 216-17, 234, 368, 383, 423, 449 (1988).
214. Foulston & Stovall, supra note 135, at 30.
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was to suggest that the State take substantial "protective measures," such as

strict parole terms and an order to stay away from places where children
tend to congregate.215 Probation and parole terms such as these, however,
accompany nearly every child molester's release and history indicates that
this solution is no protection at all.216 It is illogical to assume that an
offender who disregards the sanctions imposed by law and the social stigma
that accompanies a conviction for a sex offense will be deterred from further
21 7
offending by threats of incarceration for a probation or parole violation.
Moreover, stringent conditions imposed on an offender can last only as
long as his probation or parole term. An offender who has not been treated
for a mental abnormality that renders him likely to engage in future sex
crimes is left free to reoffend, away from the watchful eye of his correctional officer, once his term expires. For instance, Larry Don McQuay, a Texas
prison inmate who admitted to molesting over 240 children, was released on
parole to the Central Texas Parole Violator Facility in 1996 under more than
a dozen rules.2"' McQuay, who has sworn that he will not only reoffend
but will be forced to kill his future victims to keep them from reporting
him,21 9 must wear an electronic monitoring device at all times, is accompanied to his job by a security officer, is locked in a cell while at the
facility, and cannot have any contact with children.220 Because McQuay
was sentenced to parole for just two years, however, he should be released

215. Justice O'Connor is reported to have remarked in response to this suggestion that
"we all know as a practical matter that's not very effective." Id. at 31.
216. According to a 1995 study, it was estimated that of over three million adult
offenders on probation, between "25 to 50 percent of these offenders [were] in noncompliance with their court-ordered conditions or program requirements." Faye S. Taxman,
Intermediate Sanctions: Dealing with Technical Violators, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1995,
at 46. Moreover, technical violators account for 20 to 80 percent of new prison intakes each
year. Id. at 50. Critics of parole have similarly noted that surveillance of offenders is often
"dangerously inadequate." BELINDA ROGERS MCCARTHY & BERNARD J. MCCARTHY, JR.,
COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS 241 (Cynthia C. Stormer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
217. For example, Gene Raymond Kane was released to a work-release center in 1988
after serving a thirteen year sentence for attacking two women. After just two months, Kane
raped and killed another woman despite the fact that his parole conditions included an
increase in correctional supervision through his confinement at the work-release center. See
Siegel, supra note 3.
218. Kelley Shannon, Texas Child Molester to Spend Parole Under Constant Guard,
BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 9, 1996, at A4, available in 1996 WL 5834831. McQuay is so certain
that he will continue to molest children upon his release from confinement that he has
begged Texas officials to castrate him in hopes that it will rid him of his deviant sexual
impulses.
219. McQuay reportedly wrote several letters to a victims' rights group stating that he
would kill his next victims and signed the letters "child-molesting demon." Id.
220. Id.
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from the facility sometime in 1998, at which time all conditions of his
parole will be lifted. 221

Other opponents of the new involuntary commitment statutes have

advocated longer sentences for sex offenders in lieu of commitment. 2
While longer sentences for sexual offenses should be considered, several
problems are evident in merely lengthening sentences without also
implementing a civil commitment statute for sexual predators. First, while
lengthening the sentence of some offenders may mean that they would spend
life in prison and thus, would be unable to reoffend, this would not be true
in every case.223 Therefore, the same problem that states with no involun-

tary civil commitment statutes face today would not be alleviated but merely

delayed. When a repeat offender's term expired, a state would be forced to
release him, whether he received treatment or not and whether he was cured
of his abnormality or not. Moreover, the offender who would be subject to
life in prison under longer sentencing laws, if committed instead, may be
rehabilitated and returned to the community thus alleviating a drain on the

state's resources by long-term prison offenders.

Second, merely lengthening the sentences for sex crimes without
instituting any kind of commitment statute has no bearing on the thousands
of sexually violent predators currently incarcerated in the state prisons. 224
Because of constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto lawmaking, a

state may not lengthen the sentence for those offenders incarcerated prior to
a reform in the law.

25

Thus, even if sentences are lengthened, a state

221. William Raspberry, Protecting Society from Sex Crimes, TIMES UNION, Apr. 12,
1996, at A15, availablein 1996 WL 9537987.
222. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (Kan. 1996) (in holding the Kansas

statute unconstitutional, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that under the Habitual Criminal

Act the trial court that last convicted Hendricks could have tripled his sentence, sentenced
him to the maximum term, or could have ordered his sentences to run consecutively not
concurrently); see also Boerner, supra note 56, at 548.
223. An example of the kinds of problems that arise with merely lengthening the
sentences for sex offenses becomes clear in light of the McQuay case. McQuay, who
admitted to molesting over 240 children was, nevertheless, only convicted of molesting one
child. McQuay was sentenced to eight years of which he served six. See Shannon, supra

note 218; see also Bryan Denson, CastrationBill No Help for Jailed Sex Offender: Only
One Conviction Makes Him Ineligible, THE HOUSTON POST, Mar. 27, 1995, at A13, available

in 1995 WL 10270386. It is difficult to believe that any state would impose a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for one act of sexual violence.
Yet, McQuay is the kind of candidate for whom the involuntary civil commitment laws were
created.
224. Boerner, supra note 56, at 549-50. Boemer notes that such a result was simply
unacceptable to the Task Force members.
225. Id.
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could conceivably be forced to release previously sentenced dangerous sex

offenders upon the expiration of their prison terms for decades after the
reform.
Third, many problems arise in the application of the law to the sex
offender in the form of prosecutorial discretion.226 Prosecutors have wide

discretion in not only when to bring sexual assault charges, but also in
dismissing those charges in the form of plea bargaining. A 1993 congres-

sional report found that more than fifty percent of all rape charges are
dropped before trial or end in an acquittal.227 A study in Arizona likewise
found that of the fifty-one rapists in the sample, only about twenty-seven
percent were actually convicted of rape on an original rape charge.22 For
the most part, the rape charges were pled down to kidnapping. 229 Studies

also indicate that the way in which claims of sexual assault are handled

depends upon a variety of legally inappropriate factors. For example,
"nontraditional" women or women who behaved at the time of the rape
in
a "questionable" manner are seen as victims less deserving of legal
protections. 230 An historical distrust of rape victims, especially where the

226. Judicial discretion in determining sentencing lengths similarly provides slim
protection to would-be victims of repeat sex offenses. Studies indicate that sentences tend
to be shorter for rape convictions when the offender and the victim are acquaintances and
where both are black. See Cassia Spohn & Jeffrey Spears, The Effect of Offender and Victim
Characteristicson Sexual Assault Case ProcessingDecisions, 13 JUST. Q. 649, 675 (1996).

Most notable, however, is how the different races of the victim and the offender determines
sentence lengths. White men who assault white women tend to receive shorter sentences
than black men who assault white women. Id. This, researchers suggest, is because judges
see sexual assaults by an offender on a victim of the same race as less serious than assaults
involving victims and offenders of a different race. Id. Historical racist and sexist attitudes
are also evident in sentencing lengths given to black offenders where their white victims
were engaged in some kind of "gender inappropriate" behavior such as hitchhiking, drinking
alone at a bar, or inviting the offender into her home. Id. at 669, 676. These offenders
receive the shortest sentences of any offender, including white men who assault white women
under the same circumstances. Id. at 676. Thus, while increasing sentence lengths for sexual
offenses is a positive step in curbing such crimes, increasing sentence lengths alone is not
enough. Absent indeterminate sentencing, judges are free to interject racist and sexist
attitudes into the determination, thus resulting in inappropriately short sentences for certain

offenders. The time an offender is committed under the sex predator statutes, on the other
hand, is not fact specific but is based solely upon the time it takes to cure an offender of his
mental abnormality. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994 & Supp. 1996). This

determination is based heavily upon the psychological evaluations of experts presented by
the State or the offender and can be made by a jury rather than a judge. Id.
227. Dusky, supra note 207, at 381.
228. Simon, supra note 131, at 395.

229. Id.
230. Spohn & Spears, supra note 226, at 676.
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victim and rapist are acquaintances, 231 may also affect the prosecutor's
decision on whether to or how to charge an offender.
Prosecutors often feel forced to drop some charges in an attempt to plea
bargain where the prosecution's case is weak or where the government is

232
either unable to locate the victim or the victim refuses to testify.

Whether sexual assault related charges are not brought or are dropped due
to sexist attitudes concerning rape victims, or due to a weak prosecutorial
case, the result is the same. An offender who is never convicted of a sexual
assault for whatever reason will not be subject to a reform in sentencing

lengths for sexual offenses.

Under the best designed involuntary commitment statutes, however, an
offender is still subject to a petition for commitment where all charges of a
sexual nature have been dropped in favor of non-sexually related charges. 233 For instance, in Kansas a petition may be filed when an offender

is within ninety days of release from confinement for the conviction of a

"sexually violent offense. ' 2 3 A "sexually violent offense," however, is
any offense that has "been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have
been sexually motivated. ' 235 Thus, where a sexual assault charge is pled

down to a lesser offense like simple assault, a petition to involuntarily

236
commit the offender may still be filed.
Finally, in states that have no existing involuntary commitment statute
for sexual predators, state officials are often forced to release sex offenders
they know to be dangerous upon the expiration of the offender's prison

term. Such was the case with Earl Shriner.237 Officials attempted at one
231. SUSAN

ESTRICH, REAL RAPE,

29 (1987).

232. In 1987 and 1988, Earl Shriner, the man who mutilated the Tacoma boy, was
charged with two felonies. The first, in 1987, for assault in the second degree was reduced
to attempted simple assault, a misdemeanor, because the victim could not be found. The
second, in 1988, for attempted statutory rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment
was reduced to attempted unlawful imprisonment, a gross misdemeanor, because the victim,
a ten-year-old boy, would not return to the state to testify. The prosecutor explained that if
either case had gone to trial, the government would have "ended up with nothing, twice."
Boerner, supra note 56, at 544-45.
233. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(12) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
234. Id. This section similarly provides for a petition where the offender has been
determined not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or where the
offender has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial for a sexually violent offense.
235. Id. § 59-29a02.
236. See id. §§ 59-29a02 to 59-29a03; see also id. § 59-29a14 (providing for a
procedure for the State to file a "special allegation of sexual motivation" for a crime other
than a sex offense and a procedure for the court or jury to determine that the offense was
committed with a sexual motivation).
237. See Boerner, supra note 56, at 527.
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time to commit Shriner under the involuntary commitment statute for the
mentally ill, but the court found that he did not meet the criteria under that
statute.23 a This was because Washington, like many other states, 239 had
reformed its civil commitment system to provide short-term care for
individuals with acute illnesses. 24 On the other hand, the new civil
commitment statutes for sexual predators are geared towards the long-term
confinement of individual's suffering from mental abnormalities that result
in repetitive sexual offenses.
B. A UNIFORM SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT

Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief
with the Supreme Court in support of the State of Kansas in relation to the
Hendricks case.24 ' But, at the time the Hendricks case was decided by the
Supreme Court in June of 1997, only seventeen states reportedly had some
kind of civil commitment statute or mandatory treatment program for repeat
sex offenders.242 While many of the statutes are modeled after each other,
they all contain significant differences. Because it is plausible that many
more states will adopt an involuntary commitment statute for sexual
predators in the future, a uniform act utilizing those elements found in the
current statutes that are best suited to protect the community from repeat sex
offenders is in order.
The statutes currently in effect appear to fall roughly between one of
two groups. One group of statutes, those which most closely resemble the
Washington statute, permit a state to involuntarily commit an offender after
he has served a prison term for the crime which becomes the basis of his

238. Id.
239. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2901 (1994) (providing for the short-term care
of mentally ill persons and a rapid return to the community).
240. Boerner, supra note 56, at 543.
241. Those states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1997) (for text of amicus brief see 1996
WL 471076). Wisconsin filed a separate amicus brief. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076
(for text of amicus brief see 1996 WL 469205).
242. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2099 app. (Breyer, J., dissenting). IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 709C.1-709C.12 was repealed just after Hendricks was decided. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
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commitment.243 The other group of statutes provide for an offender to be
subject to treatment only while under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections 244 or in lieu of a prison term.245 Thus, when an offender is
incarcerated by the Department of Corrections on a criminal charge, he must
be released from the treatment program once the maximum time has expired
to which he was sentenced for the criminal charge. 246 Because, under the
latter group of statutes, an offender may be released prior to a determination
that he no longer poses a danger to the community, the uniform act should
be modeled after the Washington statute and its progeny.
Opponents of sex predator statutes argue that if an offender actually
suffers from some kind of mental abnormality, there is no reason to delay
treatment until after a prison sentence is served.24 There are some very
valid reasons, however, for subjecting an offender to a criminal sentence
prior to a civil commitment. Sexual predators have the same opportunity as
other violent offenders to offer the defense of mental illness and if
adjudicated as such, to escape a criminal sentence. In fact, the involuntary
commitment statutes provide for the civil commitment of an offender who
24
is found not guilty of the criminal charge due to a mental illness. ' There
simply is no reason why an offender, who is determined to be mentally
competent, should not be subject to the possible retributive and deterrent
effects of a criminal conviction and subsequent sentence, especially since
"sexual predators can recognize the difference between right and
wrong. 249 Moreover, our criminal justice system has for too long
disregarded the voices of sexual assault victims who may derive some
healing in seeing their abuser brought to justice, incarcerated on a criminal
243. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4602 (West Supp. 1997). Illinois has also
recently adopted a statute allowing for commitment after a prison term. See 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 207/10 (West Supp. 1998).
244. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11.7-103(4)(b) (West 1997) (providing for
a sex offender treatment board to institute a treatment program to be "utilized by offenders
who are placed on probation, incarcerated with the department of corrections, placed on
parole, or placed in community corrections").
245. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-567(c) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for
a court to sentence the defendant in accordance with his conviction and to order the
defendant to a treatment facility for "custody, care and treatment" but only for so long as the
"maximum period specified in the sentence").
246. See id.

247. See, e.g., Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

248. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
249. Teir & Coy, supra note 26, at 425. This certainly seems to be'true in the case of
McQuay who, as noted earlier, refers to himself as a "child-molesting demon" and has

begged Texas officials to "remember the innocent little children and do the right thing by
allowing all child molesters access to the [castration] surgery." Denson, supra note 223.
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conviction, and subject to the societal condemnation that follows such a
conviction.
There are many elements that nearly all the new sexual predator
statutes have in common that should be incorporated into the uniform act.
For instance, the uniform act should follow the legislative findings in the
Washington statute and its progeny, recognizing that the ability to treat sex
offenders "in a prison setting is poor" and that the treatment requirements
for sex offenders are "very long term." 2" The commitment provisions for
sexually violent predators should be indefinite, allowing for release only
after it has been determined that an offender can safely return to the
community. As noted above, statutes that require an offender to be released
from the treatment facility upon the expiration of the maximum term for the
underlying charge simply cannot protect the community from an offender
who is not yet cured.
A sexually violent predator should be defined as any person "who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined
in a secure facility."25' The proposed act should permit the filing of a
petition whenever it is suspected that an offender has engaged in a "sexually
violent offense." Unlike the Washington statute and its progeny, this
definition should not include a requirement that the offender be previously
charged with or convicted of a sexually violent offense,252 as the filing of
a petition should be based upon the commission of the act and not how the
system has chosen to handle the offender. This would permit the proposed
act to apply to an offender who is suffering from pedophilia but who has not
been charged with a sexual offense because, for example, the statute of
limitations has run. This may occur due to prosecutorial error or because
the victim(s) did not report the crime until it was too late. The uniform act
should then provide for a hearing where it would be determined by the court
or a jury that the offender did in fact commit the stated offense.
A "sexually violent offense" should include not only those crimes
traditionally defined in terms of a sexual offense but also those found to be
sexually motivated.2 53 The proposed act should also include a stated
procedure to determine that a criminal act, other than a sex offense, was

250. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
251. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (West Supp. 1998).
252. Id. § 71.09.020(1) (stating that a "'[s]exually violent predator"' is a person "who
has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility").
253. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(12) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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committed with a sexual motivation where there is sufficient evidence to
indicate that such may be the case." This ensures that repeat offenders
like Earl Shriner will not escape the filing of a petition for commitment
simply because their conviction for a crime like first degree sexual assault
was reduced to a non-sexual offense like simple assault during the plea
bargaining stage. The new sexual predator statutes which do not provide for
this situation limit the number of repeat sexual offenders against whom a
petition may be filed and thus, afford inadequate protection to would-be
victims under certain circumstances.
Included within the uniform act should be a provision for notice to the
Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney 5 by the agency with jurisdiction over the offender, that the offender appears to meet the qualifications
of a sexually violent predator. Such notice should be given within a
reasonable time (often 90 days under the new statutes) prior to the
offender's release: (1) from a jail or prison term, but before his release to
probation or parole,256 based upon a conviction for a sexually violent
offense; (2) from custody where the person was found incompetent to stand
trial for a sexually violent offense; or (3) from custody where the person
was found not guilty, by reason of insanity, of a sexually violent offense." 7 If the offender is found incompetent to stand trial, the proposed
act should furnish a stated procedure to determine whether the offender
58
actually committed the crime with which he was charged.
In those situations where an offender receives a sentence for the
conviction of a sexually violent offense that amounts to less than the time
proposed above for notification to the Attorney General or prosecuting
attorney, or where his sentence encompasses only probation, a "hold-over"
provision, allowing for the state to maintain custody of the offender, should
be included within the uniform act. This would afford the agency with
jurisdiction enough time to file a petition against an offender who meets the
qualifications of a sexually violent predator while ensuring that the offender
remains safely in custody until such time as a probable cause hearing may
be conducted in reference to the petition.259
254. Id. § 59-29a14.
255. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4603 (West Supp. 1997).
256. In light of the high recidivism rates associated with probation and parole, (see
supra text accompanying note 216), the uniform statute should ensure that petitions are filed
prior to an offender's release from confinement rather than his release from the supervision
of the Department of Corrections. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.02 (West Supp. 1997).
257. See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 13-4602 (West Supp. 1997).
258. Id. § 13-4606D.
259. While the Washington statute, and those modeled after it, requires notice to the
Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney within three months of the offender's release from
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The petition for commitment should be filed by the Attorney General

or prosecuting attorney, within a specified time after receiving notice from

the agency with jurisdiction, when it appears to him or her that the offender
qualifies as a sexually violent predator." As most of the newly enacted
sexual predator statutes provide, the petition should allege sufficient facts to
" ' This
support the allegation.26
petition should apply equally to both adult
2
and juvenile offenders. 62

The uniform act should include a provision for a probable cause

hearing at which the offender has (1) the right to be represented by an
attorney; (2) the right to present evidence on his own behalf; (3) the right
to cross-examine witnesses; and (4) the right to copy relevant and material
evidence within the court file.263 When probable cause exists to believe
the offender is a sexual predator, he should be detained for trial. The
offender should be subject to a psychological evaluation to determine

whether the offender has a mental abnormality or personality disorder which

renders him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. 264 He
should also be afforded the right to obtain his own qualified expert, and if
he is indigent the court should assist him in obtaining an expert to perform
an evaluation on his behalf.265 It should not be necessary that the expert
feel the offender has a condition that is "treatable" in order to civilly
commit him as some current statutes require, because the Supreme Court has
already noted that a dangerous offender need not be released into the

total confinement, they do not appear to provide for any kind of hold-over provision for the
offender who is incarcerated for less than three months except in the instance of the offender
who is returned to prison for a parole violation. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025
(West Supp. 1998). While it may seem improbable that an offender who appears to meet
the qualifications of a sexually violent predator would be subject to a sentence of either less
than 90 days in prison or probation with no time served, this happens quite often as it did
several times in the case of Earl Shriner. Shriner served just 66 days in jail for seconddegree assault and just 67 days in jail for attempted unlawful imprisonment after tying a boy
to a fence post and beating him. Boerner, supra note 56, at 527. Shriner was originally
charged with statutory rape in addition to the unlawful imprisonment charge in connection
with the latter offense but that charge was dropped. Id.; see also supra text accompanying
note 232.
260. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (Supp. 1996). Kansas requires the petition
to be filed within 75 days of receiving notice from the agency with jurisdiction over the
offender.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
263. Id. § 71.09.040(3).
264. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05(d) (Supp. 1996).
265. Id. § 59-29a06; see also supra text accompanying note 90.

A UNIFORM ACT FOR SEXUAL PREDATORS

community simply because he suffers from a condition that is, of yet,
untreatable.2
At the offender's trial to determine whether he is a sexually violent predator, the offender should maintain all those constitutional rights available to

a defendant in a criminal trial. 267 The offender should similarly be allowed

to elect a trial by judge or by jury. 268 The burden of proof to adjudge the
offender a sexually violent predator should be set at beyond a reasonable
doubt.269

While some of the new statutes provide for a psychological examination
every six months to determine if the offender still constitutes a danger to
society, others provide such examinations only annually. Because legislative
findings indicate that treatment needs for sexually violent predators is "long
term, ' ' 7 the uniform act should incorporate the more appropriate annual
" ' The findings of these examinations should be reported to
examinations.27
the court so that the court may determine whether another probable cause hearing is in order before continuing to detain the offender.272 Finally, the Secretary of the Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services should similarly
be allowed to petition the court for the offender's release should he or she

believe that the offender no longer presents a danger to the community.273
CONCLUSION

One repeat sex offender can inflict pain, humiliation, and degradation
on tens or even hundreds of victims. Because society has not developed a
266. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997) (stating that "we have never
held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment
is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others"). Still, many of the current
commitment statutes for sex predators that were not modeled after Washington's statute
require the court to determine that treatment is available before sentencing the offender to
a treatment program or require the offender to be sent back to prison to wait out his sentence
where he is uncooperative or where he is not amenable to treatment. See, e.g., NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-2929 (Michie Supp. 1996). Such a statute does not protect the public from
sexually violent predators whose mental abnormality makes it likely that they will continue
to engage in acts of sexual violence upon their release from prison.
267. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(lm) (West Supp. 1997).
268. Id. § 980.05(2).
269. Id. § 980.05(3)(b). Statutes not modeled after the Washington statute often do not
provide such stringent protections to the accused. For example, the Oregon statute allows
an offender to be committed when it is determined that an offender is a sexually violent
person merely by clear and convincing evidence. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.675(2) (1995).
270. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992).
271. Id. § 71.09.070.
272. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
273. Id. § 59-29a10.
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means to prevent a person from becoming a repeat sex offender, this
country's citizens, especially its children, must rely for their protection on
state judicial systems to identify and isolate these offenders in an effort to
prevent future victimization.
History indicates that traditional state law reforms, such as increasing
the length of an offender's sentence or subjecting the offender to more
stringent parole terms, when not used in conjunction with a commitment
statute, are insufficient. Without involuntary commitment statutes designed
specifically to hold a sexual predator until he is cured of his mental
abnormality or personality disorder, state officials have no legally adequate
means to protect the community from further victimization. The design of
the criminal justice system in states without commitment statutes requires
an official to release a repeat sex offender into the community who is highly
likely to engage in further predatory acts of sexual violence. This is simply
unacceptable.
In recent years, our state legislators have developed a solution designed
to benefit both the offender, who receives necessary care and treatment, and
the community, which receives vital protection. Because commitment
statutes will limit the number of future victims who will suffer devastating
trauma at the hands of a repeat sex offender, a uniform act as proposed in
this Comment should be implemented in every state.
LISA A. WILSON

